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Smarter "Smart" Sanctions
Peter L. Fitzgerald*
I. Introduction
Targeted or "smart" sanctions are still pretty dumb. Governments
need to do more to design their sanctions programs with commercial
practicality in mind, and businesses and others in the regulated
community need to work more closely with government to ensure that
these programs are workable and capable of achieving their stated
objectives.
Economic and financial sanctions, whether aimed at countries such
as Iran or North Korea or more amorphous targets like weapons
proliferators, narco-traffickers, and global terrorists, are increasingly
important tools for governments attempting to address some of the more
intractable international issues of the late 2 0 th and early 2 1St centuries.
However, sanctions are also an example of the sort of regulatory program
where achieving governmental policy objectives depends more upon
voluntary compliance than upon actual governmental enforcement.
Nevertheless, as documented by the recent British House of Lords
Economic Affairs Committee's Inquiry into the Impact of Targeted
Sanctions,1 the Swedish Institute of International Law's Report to the
Swedish Foreign Office on Legal Safeguards and Targeted Sanctions in
2002,2 and the congressionally created Judicial Review Commission on
Foreign Asset Control's Final Report to Congress in 2001, 3 the
* © Peter L. Fitzgerald; Professor of Law; Stetson University College of Law;
Gulfport, Florida. This paper was adapted from Written Evidence initially prepared for
the British House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee, and portions of the text are
included in House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee, THE IMPACT OF ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS, VOL. II: EVIDENCE, Second Report of Session (HL Paper 96-Il) (2007), at
149.
1. House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee, THE IMPACT OF ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS, Second Report of Session (HL Paper 96-11) (2007).
2. lain Cameron, Swedish Institute of International Law, REPORT TO THE SWEDISH
FOREIGN OFFICE ON LEGAL SAFEGUARDS AND TARGETED SANCTIONS, (OCTOBER 2002)
available at http://resources.jur.uu.se/repository/5/PDF/staff/sanctions.pdf.
3. Judicial Review Commission on Foreign Asset Control, FINAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS (January 2001). The congressionally created Judicial Review Commission on
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governmental blacklisting of particular entities or individuals that lies at
the heart of what are now called "smart" or "targeted" sanctions
programs is beset with numerous issues that undermine compliance and
impacts the perceived legitimacy of these programs. Uncertainty
regarding the details of the controls, the obligations they impose, and the
manner of their enforcement, is the single greatest impediment to the
types of commercially practicable sanctions that would lead to more
widespread voluntary compliance.
There are five principal areas of uncertainty associated with the
sanctions as currently formulated and administered. These can be seen
most clearly by focusing upon the anti-terrorist sanctions programs.
II. The Compliance Issues Posed by Smart Sanctions
A. Uncertainty as to Who Comprises the "Regulated Community" that
Must Comply with the Sanctions
At their core, economic sanctions are controls that are directed
primarily at, and implemented by, banks and financial institutions.
4
However, reflecting their origins as foreign policy tools, sanctions
programs are often written in broad terms that impose compliance
Foreign Asset Control prepared the most comprehensive review of U.S. economic
sanctions programs since the examination of the WWII era controls conducted in 1947.
The Commission was established by Congress as part of a legislative compromise when
it passed the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act, because of concerns over the
due process issues associated with the blacklisting mechanisms in the various U.S.
economic sanctions programs. Chaired by Larry D. Thompson, prior to his becoming
Deputy Attorney General in the Bush Administration, the Commission conducted a year
long $1 million study of the sanctions programs administered by the Treasury
Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control ("OFAC"). The Commission's Final
Report to Congress was submitted to the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on January 23, 2001. The
House Committee on International Relations, House Committee on the Judiciary, Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations and Senate Committee on the Judiciary also received
copies. The Report, and its accompanying appendices, totals approximately 1900 pages.
While only a few hard copies were printed, the Report is available in microfiche at
selected Federal Depository Libraries under SuDoc. Y 3.2:F 76/F 49; Y 3.2:F 76/F
49/V.1-2; GPO Item No. 1089 (MF) and it is also available online at
http://www.law.stetson.edu/JudicialReviewCommission/.
4. As stated by the general counsel of the U.S. Treasury Department in his
testimony before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and
Homeland Security, with particular regard to the anti-terrorist sanctions:
[t]his is a profoundly uncommon war.... It is shadow warfare. The primary
source of the stealth and mobility necessary to wage it is money. It is the fuel
for the enterprise of terror .... If we stop the money, we stop the killing.
Written Testimony of David D. Aufhauser General Counsel, Department of the Treasury
before the Judiciary Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security,
June 26, 2003, available at http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/reports/js5071 .pdf.
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obligations on those both within and without the financial community,
and for all transactions with blacklisted parties, involving even the
smallest amount or account. 5
From the perspective of those who must comply with the controls,
however, this creates uncertainty as to the scope of one's compliance
obligations. In the United States this is sometimes called the
"McDonald's problem." 6 Is a fast-food retailer obligated to establish a
compliance process for all its cash hamburger sales to ensure that it does
not engage in a transaction with Osama bin Laden or one of the other
individuals or entities found on a governmental blacklist? Put
differently, is it sound policy to require those outside the financial
community to choose between establishing expensive internal
compliance processes for all of their operations irrespective of the risks
posed under the circumstances or, alternatively, to rely upon
prosecutorial discretion in the event a technically prohibited transaction
occurs?
Ironically, the result of broadly written controls is not wider
compliance. Rather, those outside of the financial institutions at the core
of the controls, recognizing that governmental enforcement resources are
limited, may not engage in a high degree of "voluntary" compliance with
what they perceive to be commercially impractical requirements. The
government then loses the leverage that broader compliance would offer
in achieving governmental policy objectives.7
5. The governmental blacklisting of particular entities and individuals was
historically used as a secondary tool to augment a primary economic embargo directed at
particular geographic enemy, often as an adjunct to actual hostilities. See P.L. Fitzgerald,
Managing "Smart Sanctions" Against Terrorism Wisely, 36 NEw ENGLAND L. R. 957,
980 (2002). Over the past several decades blacklisting shifted from being a secondary
tool incidental to actual or economic warfare against another state, to become a primary
tool whereby governments sought to lead or alternatively coerce other nations into
different actions as a foreign policy matter, or to distance a country and its nationals from
other states engaged in undesirable behavior. See P.L. Fitzgerald, "If Property Rights
Were Treated Like Human Rights, They Could Never Get Away With This ": Blacklisting
and Due Process in U.S. Economic Sanctions Programs, 51 HAST. L.J. 73, 89-90 (1999).
6. See e.g., Statement Of Donald Ray Looper Before The Judicial Review
Commission on Foreign Asset Control (September 22, 2000) in Judicial Review
Commission on Foreign Asset Control, APPENDICES TO THE FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
(January 2001), Vol. 1, Appendix E-Written Submissions from Witnesses Who
Testified, 172, at 179, available at http://www.law.stetson.edu/
JudicialReviewCommission/frtcappendicesvolumelE.pdf.
7. Achieving broader compliance that reaches outside of the financial industry that
typically comprises the regulated community for economic sanctions programs is
particularly important in the anti-terrorist sanctions. As the U.S. Treasury Department
counsel Aufhauser also noted:
[t]errorist financing is a unique form of financial crime. Unlike money
laundering, which is finding dirty money that is trying to hide; terrorist
financing is often clean money being used for lethal purposes.... Terrorists
2007]
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Given the importance of the objectives behind targeted sanctions,
governments need to move beyond the mere political statement made by
adding names to a blacklist and create a system where the controls
triggered by the act of blacklisting are more effective. The former
general counsel for the U.S. Treasury Department, David Aufhauser,
noted that "both terrorist financing and traditional financial crimes have
one thing in common-they leave a financial footprint that allows us to
trace financial flows, unravel terrorist financing networks, and uncover
terrorist sleeper cells."' 8  Unlike much of the other evidence gathered
relating to terrorism, which can be "suspect, the product of interrogation,
rewards, betrayals, deceits... a financial record doesn't lie." 9 The U.S.
Secretary of the Treasury, Henry M. Paulson Jr. recently noted:
[t]he starting point for Treasury's approach to targeted financial
measures is information. To identify and act against threats, we need
specific, current, and reliable intelligence. And the global financial
system is a rich source of the information we need.... In 2004,
have also used informal value transfer systems such as hawala as a means of
terrorist financing. The word "hawala" (meaning "trust") refers to a fast and
cost-effective method for the worldwide remittance of money or value,
particularly for persons who may be outside the reach of the traditional
financial sector .... The United States has already taken steps to regulate
hawalas and informal value transfer systems. The PATRIOT Act requires
money remitters (informal or otherwise) to register as "money services
businesses" or "MSBs," thereby subjecting them to existing money laundering
and terrorist financing regulations, including customer identification, record
keeping and suspicious transaction reporting requirements. Well over 14,000
money service businesses have registered with the federal government and are
now required to report suspicious activities. In order to increase awareness
within the diverse MSB community nationwide about their obligations under
the MSB rules, FinCEN plans to conduct an outreach campaign to include
advertising, community outreach and the distribution of educational materials.
Written Testimony of David D. Aufhauser General Counsel, Department of the Treasury
before the Judiciary Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security,
June 26, 2003, available at http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/reports/js507 .pdf.
8. Id.
9. The Treasury Department General Counsel continued to state that financial
records are:
enormously useful-helping to identify, locate and capture bad guys, mapping
out a network of connections that tie an anonymous banker to a suicide bomber,
helping to evaluate the credibility and immediacy of a threat, and preventing a
calamity by starving the enterprise of terror of its fuel.... I [once believed]
that a dollar well deployed could enhance opportunity and thereby diminish
antipathy to our values. But I now know that preventing a dollar from being
misapplied can be of equal service and is, perhaps, the surest weapon we have
to make the homeland secure and to let our kids go to schools that teach
tolerance and respect for people of all faiths.
Oral Testimony of David D. Aufhauser General Counsel, Department of the Treasury
before the Judiciary Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security,
June 26, 2003, available at http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/js507.htm.
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Treasury became the first finance ministry in the world to develop in-
house intelligence and analytic expertise to use this information. We
now work with the broader intelligence community, requesting the
data necessary to understand the financial networks that threaten our
national security. Treasury then evaluates this information with an
eye towards potential action-be it a designation, an advisory to the
private sector, or a conversation to alert other finance ministers to a
particular threat or bad actor.10
Thus, well-crafted economic sanctions can serve as an important tool in
gathering the intelligence necessary to deal with threats like global
terrorism and weapons proliferation in addition to simply blocking
targeted parties' access to their assets.
The "leakage" from economic sanction programs that was
acceptable when the controls were only a secondary foreign policy tool
directed against a foreign state should no longer be tolerable when the
objective is preventing actual acts of terrorism or gathering the
information necessary to prosecute those who commit such acts.
Accordingly, governments need to identify more precisely who should
comply with their controls, using a risk based analysis, and then
collaborate with that regulated community in creating economic
sanctions that are commercially practical and enforceable in order to
enhance compliance. As is done in many other financial regulatory
programs, this is an approach that adjusts compliance obligations based
upon the size and nature of the institution involved, its market, products
and services, and the likelihood of encountering those parties targeted by
the sanctions program.
B. Uncertainty as to the Targets of Targeted Sanctions
Providing accurate information precisely identifying a particular
party or entity as a sanctions target is often difficult, but is nevertheless
crucial for an efficient screening system for any business seeking to
determine which transactions should be controlled or assets blocked or
frozen. Blacklists are inherently both under- and over-inclusive. For
example, while "Usama Bin Ladin" was blacklisted in the United States
as early as August 22, 1998, "Osama bin Laden" did not appear on the
list until after the 9/11 attacks. 1 Similarly, following the attacks in 2001,
the United Nations, European Union, and the Bank of England added
10. U.S. Treasury Dept., Press Release HP-457, Remarks by Treasury Secretary
Paulson on Targeted Financial Measures to Protect Our National Security (June 14,
2007) available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp457.htm.
11. See P.L. Fitzgerald, Managing Smart Sanctions Against Terrorism Wisely, supra
note 5, at 968-69.
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"Osama bin Laden" to their blacklists under a number of aliases and
variations. However, even today neither the U.N. Consolidated List, nor
the Bank of England's list, show the alternate spelling of "bin Ladin."'
' 2
If a precise match with a government blacklist is required, targeted
individuals and entities might escape the controls due to minor variations
in the names. Conversely, if not enough rigor is applied in the matching
process, a blacklist screening system can easily be overwhelmed by the
number of false matches. A similar issue arises when common names
appear on the blacklist, generating a large number of unintended
matches. For example, under the old Yugoslav sanctions programs the
common but indefinite name "Global" was found on the blacklist without
any further identifying information. 13 In the recent past, press reports
have indicated that prominent figures such as Senator Ted Kennedy or
the President of Bolivia, or even children, were erroneously stopped at
airports because of the similarity between their names and those
appearing on the U.S. terrorist "no fly" blacklist.' 4  These types of
problems are further exacerbated when the names of those individuals
and entities targeted by the blacklist have multiple spellings or are being
transliterated. For example, the Arabic "<ez" may be transliterated as
Muhammad, Mohammad, Mohammed, Mohamed, Muhammed,
Mahommed, Mehmed, Mehmet, and Mahomet; and many other common
Arabic or foreign names that appear among the current sanctions
blacklist entries may similarly appear in multiple forms or spellings.1
5
While government authorities have tried to address these problems
in many of the newer blacklist entries by providing more specific
information regarding the targeted parties, many of the old entries (e.g.
the original U.N. Taliban lists) remain without any unique identifiers. As
there are more than six thousand different parties or entities found on the
various governmental blacklists, all of which must be incorporated into a
company's internal compliance and screening programs, matching
12. See U.N. Consolidated List of Individuals And Entities Belonging to or
associated with the Taliban and Al-Qaida Organization as Established and Maintained by
the 1267 Committee, available at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/
tablelist.htm; Bank of England Consolidated List of Financial Sanctions Targets (Full
List), available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/financialsanctions/
sanctionsconlist.htm.
13. See P.L. Fitzgerald "If Property Rights Were Treated Like Human Rights, They
Could Never Get Away With This"..., supra note 5, at 123.
14. See e.g., Steve Krofl, Unlikely Terrorists on No Fly List, CBS 60 Minutes, (June
7, 2007) available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/10/05/60minutes/
main2066624.shtml.
15. See Brian Whitaker, Lost in Translation, The Guardian Unlimited (June 10,
2002) available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/elsewhere/j oumalist/story/
0,7792,730805,00.html; see also http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muhammad_%28
disambiguation%29.
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accounts and customers to the blacklist entries poses significant
problems.
What should be done with a transaction in London involving
"Mohammed Salah," for example? Shortly after the attacks in 2001, the
U.N. blacklisted "Muhammad Salah (individual) (a.k.a. Nasr Fahmi Nasr
Hasanayn)" as part of its Al Qaida and Taliban sanctions, 16 and the E.U.
added the same entry in 2002.'7 In 2004, the U.N. and the E.U. both
updated their blacklist information to indicate that "Muhammad Salah"
was in fact an alias for "Nasr Fahmi Nasr Hassannein" or perhaps "Naser
Fahmi Naser Hussein," and added that the target was born on October
30, 1962, in Cairo.18 All of this is reflected on the Bank of England's
Consolidated List, 19 but the blacklist maintained by the U.S. Treasury
Department's Office of Foreign Asset Control only shows the more
limited original information from 2001.20 However, the U.S. does have
another "specially designated terrorist" blacklist entry, related to its
sanctions on those who threaten the Middle East peace process, which
reads:
SALAH, Mohammad Abd El-Hamid Khalil (a.k.a. AHMAD, Abu;
a.k.a. AHMED, Abu; a.k.a. SALAH, Mohammad Abdel Hamid
Halil; a.k.a. SALAH, Muhammad A.), 9229 South Thomas,
Bridgeview, IL 60455; P.O. Box 2578, Bridgeview, IL 60455; P.O.
Box 2616, Bridgeview, IL 60455-661; Israel; DOB 5/30/53; Passport
024296248 (United States); SSN 342-52-7612 (individual) [SDT]. 2 1
The name "Mohammed Salah" does not precisely match any of these
entries, irrespective of the varying amounts of detail provided by the
different blacklisting authorities. A business struggling with complying
16. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Committee Concerning
Afghanistan Issues List Pursuant To Paragraph 8(C) Of Resolution 1333 (2000),_U.N.
Doc._AFG/150 SC/7166 (Oct. 8, 2001), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/
docs/2001/afg150.doc.htm.
17. Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 of 27 May 2002, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/lexuriserv/site/en/oj/2002/l_ 139/1_1 3920020529en00090022.pdf.
18. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Committee Approves
Correction Of Identifying Information Of Fifty-Three Individuals, Ten Entities On
Consolidated List, U.N. Doc. SC/8259 (Dec. 12, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/
News/Press/docs/2004/sc8259.doc.htm; Commission Regulation (EC) No 2145/2004 of
15 December 2004, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/
en/oj/2004/l_370/1_37020041217en00060016.pdf.
19. See Consolidated List Of Financial Sanctions Targets In The UK, available at
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/financialsanctions/sanctionsconlist.htm.
20. See Office of Foreign Assets Controls, Specially Designated and Blocked
Nationals List, available at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/
sdn/t I Isdn.pdf.
21. See id. This Specially Designated Terrorist list dates to the 1995 blacklisting of
those who threatened the Middle East peace process. See http://www.treasury.gov/
offices/enforcement/ofac/sdn/sdnew95 .txt.
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with the controls may have more information which would help it
determine if a match' with one of the blacklist entries has occurred,
depending upon the nature of the transaction and the degree to which a
particular type of business really "knows its customers." But if not, how
much additional information must it demand from its customer in order
to meet its compliance obligations before it can proceed? Clearly, if the
individual subsequently turned out to be either the 43 year old Egyptian-
born Al Qaida supporter or the 53 year old American national targeted by
the U.S. sanctions, the minor difference in the spelling would be an
indefensible distinction in either the political realm or in the marketplace
of public opinion. Transactions involving the true targets of the
sanctions need to be identified and addressed, while minimizing the
impact on dealings with those who are not the actual targets of the
sanctions programs.
Thus, in addition to structuring the sanctions programs' controls to
impose the greatest compliance obligations on a risk-based model, there
also needs to be some official avenue for those with the legal compliance
burden to definitively determine whether the party with whom they are
dealing is or is not a sanctions target, and also to resolve conflicts or
differences among the various governmental blacklists. Moreover, in
order to be commercially practicable, this needs to be both an
expeditious and reliable process. The absence of such a communication
process between regulators and the regulated community is perhaps the
single most significant compliance issue affecting the current sanctions
programs.
C. Uncertainty Regarding Liability
In a risk-based controls system businesses should not expect to face
an enforcement action for every failure to identify or block a transaction
with a blacklisted party. Standards for what constitutes an acceptable
level of compliance are needed, adjusted for the industry involved and
the risks presented.22 While a customer or account based screening
system may be appropriate for banking institutions, non-bank money
transmitters often do not have customer accounts. For example, money
orders can be issued for a low face value by a convenience store to a
22. For a number of suggestions as to how such an approach could be implemented
across different elements of the financial community refer to the various industry
responses submitted to the U.S. Treasury Department when it issued a request for
comments regarding its new enforcement practices in early 1996. See U.S. Treasury
Dept., Office of Foreign Assets Controls Economic Sanctions Enforcement Procedures
for Certain Banking Institutions, 71 Fed. Reg. 1971 (Jan. 12, 2006), and the record of
comments available at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/interim
enf guide/enfcomments.pdf.
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retail customer who may not provide a name. Even when larger non-
bank funds transmitters such as Western Union or American Express
request the names of a sender and a recipient, they may not engage in
extensive verification of their customers' or recipients' identities. While
these different businesses may all belong to the core regulated
community for sanctions purposes, the risks posed and the standards of
what constitutes an acceptable level of compliance for each might well
vary. If governments are unwilling or unable to promulgate
appropriately differentiated compliance standards themselves, regulators
should be prepared to recognize "best practices" for compliance
developed by the various private industries comprising the regulated
community.
Arriving at standards for an acceptable level of compliance is
especially important with regard to the "interdiction software" many
companies use to automatically screen their operations against blacklist
entries. For example, to what degree should the software employ fuzzy
logic, or a variable level of matching, to address whether a name like
"Mohammed Salah" or "Global" matches governmental blacklist entries?
Even with the best automated programs some transactions will slip
through the screening process. The Bank of America noted in
correspondence with the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign
Assets Control that:
[1]arge banking institutions handle millions of transactions each day
and, despite state of the art interdiction systems, frequent staff
training and the institution's best efforts, it is statistically inevitable
that a large bank will have inadvertent violations of [the] sanctions.
Inadvertent violations that do not evidence a systemic weakness in an
institution's... compliance program should not result in penalty
proceedings, nor should inadvertent violations in the past be used to
classify a large banking institution as a "repeat offender."
23
Conversely, small institutions, who lack the resources and in-house
expertise of a Bank of America to handle their own screening operations,
should be permitted to outsource their compliance systems to larger
institutions or specialized firms, and rely upon the expertise of those
running these outsourced systems rather than being held to the current
strict liability standard.
Standards for acceptable levels of compliance should also
encompass situations where "after the fact" blacklist screening may be
more commercially practicable or appropriate than the real-time
23. See Letter from Bank of America Legal Department, to U.S. Treasury Dept.
Office of Foreign Asset Controls, (Feb. 7, 2006), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/
offices/enforcement/ofac/interim/enfguide/enf comments.pdf.
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screening often urged by regulators. Real-time screening may not be
practical for a McDonalds-like or low value automated transaction
conducted at "internet speed," particularly if there are questions about a
potential match.24 Many industries assert that, in some circumstances,
"after the fact" blacklist screening can be as useful in meeting
government objectives as real-time screening. Accepting a deposit to
open a new account, for example, and then screening that account
customer against the blacklist as part of an overnight batch process
would result in the target's funds being blocked rather than being turned
away. Such a process also serves governmental identification, tracking,
and evidentiary objectives that would not be met if the transaction was
refused under a real-time screening system. Real-time blacklist
screening may also place a teller or similar individual in harm's way if it
requires informing the person attempting to open the account why the
transaction is being refused.
Lastly, once these standards for acceptable compliance are
established, they should be accompanied by "safe-harbors" from liability
for those who comply with the standards, even where an innocent or
technical violation of the sanctions has occurred. This is consistent with
a variety of other banking laws.25  A different sort of "safe-harbor,"
which clearly and expressly insulates the regulated community from
liability to its customers or account holders for freezing their accounts or
disrupting their transactions would also be a useful addition to many
sanctions laws or regulations.
D. Uncertainty Regarding How to Handle Mistakes or Challenges to
Targeted Sanctions
Mistakes are inevitably made in any blacklisting process, but often
there is no express right for an affected party to know the basis of the
blacklisting decision or to have an independent review of the
government's actions. Even in the absence of a mistake, circumstances
may change over time such that a blacklisted party may wish to
challenge the basis for its ongoing designation. A meaningful right of
24. See generally, P.L. Fitzgerald, Hidden Dangers in the E-Commerce Data Mine:
Governmental Customer and Trading Partner Screening Requirements, 35 INT'L LAW 47
(2001).
25. See e.g. Sections 313 and 319 of the USA PATRIOT ACT and 31 C.F.R.
103.177(b). U.S. law and regulations requires financial institutions to gather a variety of
information from their correspondent accounts, and prohibit maintaining correspondent
accounts with "shell banks." However, a "safe-harbor" was provided to those institutions
who obtain certain "certifications" from their foreign correspondents, in recognition of
the difficulty of the burden in gathering this information from a large number of
institutions, and the difficulty in determining whether a foreign bank is a "shell bank."
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review of these blacklisting decisions is especially important as the
number of blacklisted parties grows, along with the number of
governments promulgating these lists. Many of these sanctions
programs, including those in the U.S., fail to provide an express right for
the affected party to know the basis for a blacklisting decision. While
this certainly protects sensitive information, it also creates huge practical
hurdles for any affected party seeking to correct mistakes or otherwise
challenge the government's actions.2
6
Entirely apart from situations where the match between an account
or customer with a blacklist entry is questionable, there will be cases
where the propriety of the blacklisting of a properly identified party is at
issue. One notable example involves the Bank of America's blocking
assets worth $24 million that belonged to the Saudi Arabian
businessman, Salah Idris, in 1998. This action followed the U.S.
bombing of two of Osama bin Laden's camps in Afghanistan, along with
Idris's pharmaceutical plant in Sudan, in retaliation for the terrorist
attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Idris denied any
links to Osama bin Laden, and sued the U.S. government for defamation
and compensation. Rather than defend the lawsuit Idris's assets were
voluntarily "unblocked., 27 Although the U.S. government asserted that
the unblocking was prompted by concerns over exposing intelligence
sources if it answered the lawsuit, much of the public basis for the
government's actions regarding Idris and his El Shifa pharmaceutical
plant was subsequently discredited.28
Another example involves Maher Arar, a Syrian born Canadian
software engineer, detained by American officials in 2002 while
transiting the U.S. on his way back to Canada following a trip to Tunis.
Arar was stopped and then deported to Syria, where he was held for more
26. As initially promulgated in 1998 OFAC's Reporting and Procedures Regulations
(RPR) provided that those seeking administrative reconsideration of their blacklisting
could review the factual basis for the agency's actions, although sensitive material could
be redacted. 31 C.F.R. § 501.807 (1998). However, less than a year later, OFAC
withdrew the ability to obtain this material without explanation. See U.S. Treasury Dept,
Office of Foreign Assets Controls, Reporting and Procedures Regulation: Procedure for
Requests for Removal from List of Blocked Persons, Specially Designated Nationals,
Specially Designated Terrorists, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, Specifically
Designated Narcotics Traffickers, and Blocked Vessels, 64 Fed. Reg. 5,614 (Feb. 4,
1999). Parties may still request that a blacklisting decision be administratively
reconsidered, but they no longer have a regulatory right to review the basis for the
agency's actions. See 31 C.F.R. § 501.807 (2005).
27. See P.L. Fitzgerald, Managing "Smart Sanctions" Against Terrorism Wisely,
supra note 5, at 976-78.
28. See Doug Bandow, Making it Right in Sudan; U.S. Owes Damages For
Pharmaceutical Bombing, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2001, at A2 1. However, Idris has yet
to receive any compensation.
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than a year and tortured, on the basis of what was later determined to be
false accusations of terrorist involvement provided by Canadian police.
In 2006, the Canadian Prime Minister apologized and the government
paid $10 million (cdn) to settle Arar's civil suit in Canada, but his name
still remains on the U.S. border watchlist.
29
In comparison to the substantive and procedural safeguards
commonly found surrounding the imposition of penalties and the
deprivation of property in civil or criminal proceedings, there is very
little oversight or judicial review exercised when these same sorts of
governmental actions are styled as "foreign policy" measures as part of a
sanctions program. Even when cases get to court, doctrines regarding
standing to file a lawsuit, the scope of judicial review and deference to
executive authority, along with the traditional notion that blocking or
freezing actions are "temporary" foreign policy measures, effectively
preclude a substantive challenge to most governmental blacklisting
actions.30  An extensive review of these issues prompted the
congressionally created Judicial Review Commission on Foreign Assets
Control to focus seven of its twelve recommendations to the U.S. House
and Senate Intelligence Committees on the need for more due process
protections in the administration of the various U.S. economic sanctions
programs.
3
'
The situation in Europe is not significantly different. Sanctions
continue to be regarded as foreign policy measures largely exempt from
judicial or administrative review. For example, three Somali-born
Swedish nationals Abdi Abdulaziz, Abdirisak Aden, and Ahmed Ali
Yusuf, all employees of the Al Barakaat International Foundation branch
in Stockholm, were blacklisted and their assets frozen pursuant to
Regulation (EC) 2199/2001 on November 12, 2001.32 Their names were
included on the European blacklist because they had been added to the
U.N. Security Council blacklist on November 9, 2001, after first
appearing on the U.S. blacklist as part of the Taliban and Al Qaida
sanctions two days earlier.33 Although it froze the assets, Sweden also
29. See Ian Austen, Canada Will Pay $9.75 Million to Man Sent to Syria and
Tortured, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 27, 2007, at A5.
30. See generally P.L. Fitzgerald, Drug Kingpins and Blacklisting: Compliance
Issues with U.S. Economic Sanction (Part 1), 4 J. MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL 360
(2001); P.L. Fitzgerald, Drug Kingpins and Blacklisting: Compliance Issues with U.S.
Economic Sanction (Part 2), 5 J. MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL 66 (2001); P.L.
Fitzgerald, Drug Kingpins and Blacklisting: Compliance Issues with U.S. Economic
Sanction (Part 3), 5 J. MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL 162 (2001).
31. Judicial Review Commission on Foreign Asset Control, FNAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS, supra note 3, at 125-48.
32. See Case T-306/01, Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council
and Comm'n, 2005 E.C.R. 11-03649.
33. See U.S. Treasury Dept., Office of Foreign Assets Control, Changes to List of
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vigorously questioned the blacklisting through diplomatic channels,
arguing that without knowing the actual basis for the U.S. blacklisting
decision that triggered these controls, the Swedish government and
courts had no way of determining if their nationals were in fact guilty of
terrorist involvements, and therefore had no real way of appealing their
inclusion on the list.
34
Although the diplomatic issue was ameliorated by the U.S. asking
for the removal of two of the Swedes from the U.N. blacklist in August
of 2002, Ahmen Ali Yusuf remained on the list.35  He sued in the
European Court of First Instance alleging numerous procedural flaws and
a denial of various guarantees under the European Convention on Human
Rights. The Swedish Institute of International Law also issued a Report
to the Swedish Foreign Office on Legal Safeguards and Targeted
Sanctions strongly suggesting that there were due process issues under
the ECHR with the sanctions as formulated and administered.36
However, the European Court of First Instance broadly rejected Yusuf s
claims, and similar subsequent challenges by others, essentially holding
that while the E.U. was empowered to impose restrictive measures like
economic sanctions on individuals, it was also legally obligated to defer
to the U.N.'s blacklisting actions. Moreover, it held that any challenges
to those U.N. actions should be directed to the Security Council, as they
were outside the Court's scope of review.37  The U.N.'s
intergovernmental process for challenging a blacklist decision under the
"Guidelines of the [Sanctions] Committees for the Conduct of Its Work"
authorize a government to petition for de-listing on behalf of one of its
residents or citizens, but do not expressly provide a blacklisted party with
the right to know the basis for that action. 38  If an affected party's
Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons Since January 1, 2001, available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sdn/sdnew01 .pdf.
34. Serge Schmemann, A Nation Challenged. Sanctions and Fallout; Swedes Take
Up the Cause of 3 on U.S. Terror List, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 26, 2002, at A9.
35. See U.S. Treasury Dept., Office of Foreign Assets Control, Changes to List of
Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons Since January 1, 2002, available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sdn/sdnew02.pdf.
36. See lain Cameron, Report to the Swedish Foreign Office on Legal Safeguards
and Targeted Sanctions, supra note 2.
37. See Case T-306/01, Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council
and Comm'n, 2005 E.C.R. 11-03649 (Sept. 21, 2005); Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Council
and Comm'n, 2005 E.C.R. 11-03649 (Sept. 21, 2005); Case T-253/021, Ayadi v. Council
and Comm'n, 2005 E.C.R. 11-03649 (July 12, 2006).
38. See Security Council, Security Council Committee Established Pursuant To
Resolution 1267 (1999) Concerning Al-Qaida And The Taliban And Associated
Individuals And Entities, Guidelines Of The Committee For The Conduct Of Its Work,
available at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/1267_guidelines.pdf. The
Guidelines were adopted in November, 2002, and subsequently refined in part due to the
concerns raised in the Al Barakaat case.
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government refuses to espouse their claim to the U.N. Sanctions
Committee, the remedy for that refusal, if any is available, must be
determined under domestic national law and procedures.39
The European Court's opinions also contain language evidencing an
approach that, like the U.S. cases, regards asset blocking or freezing as a
foreign policy matter rather than a forfeiture proceeding. The Court
stated:
[i]t is clear that the applicants have not been arbitrarily deprived of
[their right to property]. In fact, in the first place, the freezing of
their funds constitutes an aspect of the sanctions decided by the
Security Council against Usama bin Laden, members of the Al-Qaeda
network and the Taliban and other associated individuals, groups,
undertakings, and entities. In that regard it is appropriate to stress the
importance of the fight against international terrorism and the
legitimacy of the protection of the United Nations against the actions
of terrorist organizations .... The measures in question pursue
therefore a legitimate objective of fundamental public interest for the
international community. In the second place, freezing of funds is a
precautionary measure which, unlike confiscation, does not affect the
very substance of the right of the persons concerned to property in
their financial assets but only the use thereof. 40
Despite all his efforts, Ahmen Ali Yusuf remained sanctioned in Europe
until the U.S. government announced the removal of his name from its
list on August 24, 2006, nearly four years after his initial blacklisting.4
1
Thus, even if the practical and procedural hurdles to judicial review
are overcome, the deference given by courts in every jurisdiction to the
exercise of executive authority in the area or foreign policy, combined
with the traditional regard for sanctions as temporary measures is likely
to preclude a reexamination of the blacklisting action. As a result, unless
the sanctions programs themselves provide for a review mechanism,
these programs are effectively devoid of the procedural and substantive
due process protections that would be associated with similar actions if
39. The Court noted in the Kahdi case:
the United Kingdom has quite rightly pointed out at the hearing, it is open to
the persons involved to bring an action for judicial review based on domestic
law, indeed even directly on the contested regulation and the relevant
resolutions of the Security Council which it puts into effect, against any
wrongful refusal by the competent national authority to submit their cases to
the Sanctions Committee for re-examination....
Case T-315/01 (Sept. 21, 2005) at 293.
40. Case T-306/01 (Sept. 21, 2005) at 293-99.
41. See U.S. Treasury Dept., Office of Foreign Assets Control, SDGT Designation
Removal, available at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/actions/
20060824.shtml.
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they were taken pursuant to civil or criminal law. However, even if
sanctions programs must be regarded as something different from similar
measures taken pursuant to civil or criminal law that should not mean
that the entire panoply of substantive and procedural protections built
into those laws should be abandoned. Post-blacklisting administrative
review procedures could afford the affected parties the ability to correct
mistakes or address changed circumstances-and provide basic due
process of law-without seriously affecting the government's control
objectives. However, those mechanisms would need to be built into the
sanctions programs themselves, rather than created by the courts. Doing
so would provide added credibility to the sanctions programs, which also
helps enhance compliance.
E. Uncertainty as to How the Sanctions are Applied and Enforced
The obligations imposed by the current sanctions programs cannot
be enforced as broadly as they are written. As a consequence, these
programs can suffer from selective and erratic enforcement that
undermines voluntary compliance.
While large banking institutions typically have the greatest
awareness of the obligations imposed by sanctions and make the greatest
efforts to comply with the controls, they are also the most likely to be the
focus of governmental enforcement efforts. If governments also desire
to promote compliance and cooperation by smaller institutions, non-
traditional funds transmitters, and others outside the large institutions at
the center of the financial community, their sanctions programs must be
more commercially practicable. The reduced compliance that results
from a perceived lack of commercial reasonableness is only reinforced
when governments then fail to devote the resources required to enforce
the sanctions as written, or only selectively enforce them for political
ends.
The U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control,
for example, is a relatively small office with limited resources. What
resources they do have are often focused-perhaps largely for domestic
political reasons-on the Cuban sanctions, rather than on the anti-
terrorist programs. In the last five years, OFAC issued more than a score
of regulatory amendments, rulings, or interpretations regarding its Cuban
sanctions. This contrasts with only five or six announcements dealing
with the substance of its anti-terrorist sanctions programs since the 2001
attacks (apart from adjusting specific blacklist entries) and a roughly
equal number of modifications to those programs following the 2006
elections which placed Hamas in control of the Palestinian Authority.
Moreover, despite initial successes in blocking or freezing significant
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funds, ensuring that the regulated community complies with these
controls does not appear to be a priority. Since OFAC began posting
summaries of civil enforcement actions on its website in April 2003, by
far the largest single category, approximately 300 cases, involve the
Cuban sanctions. This compares with only one case under the Terrorism
Sanctions Regulations, which resulted in a $2,925 penalty.42
Employing multiple blacklisting categories which trigger different
levels of restrictive measures might be one way of better tailoring both
the controls and the regulated community's compliance obligations. For
example, the sanctions applied against the primary target of a sanctions
program, such as an Osama bin Laden, could be distinguished from
controls applied against a party who only incidentally dealt with or
supported the real target of the program. However, under the current
programs there is no differentiation between these parties and a
secondary or tertiary entity is subject to the same blacklisting and the
same controls as the primary target, such as Osama bin Laden.
The U.S. Judicial Review Commission recommended addressing
this lack of refinement in the blacklisting controls by distinguishing
between what it called Tier I designees, the primary targets of the
sanctions, and Tier II designees, those who indirectly deal with the
targeted parties. It then suggested that different restrictions, compliance
obligations, and opportunities for review might be appropriate for these
second-tier blacklist designees-with whom the vast majority of
compliance issues arise.43 The burdens on both government regulators
and the regulated community would be reduced and the credibility of
these programs enhanced if more refined controls were established
distinguishing between the primary and secondary targets of the
sanctions.
In addition, if governments regard identifying and tracking
questionable funds flows and gathering evidence to prosecute the core
targets of the sanctions as important objectives, then there needs to be a
way to encourage the voluntary disclosure of information from the
regulated community without automatically regarding each disclosure as
a noncompliance matter to be handled as a civil penalty case or worse.
Rather than imposing strict liability on the regulated community, a
combination of establishing de minimis levels for compliance violations,
recognizing the value of after-the-fact batch blacklist screening in
appropriate circumstances, and establishing safe-harbors--or at least an
42. See P.L. Fitzgerald, The Cuban-Thistle Crisis: Rethinking U.S. Sanctions, 82
FOREIGN SERVICE J. 51 (2005).
43. See Judicial Review Commission on Foreign Asset Control, FINAL REPORT TO
CONGREss, supra note 3, Recommendations 1-3 at 125-37.
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intentional standard for imposing liability-would encourage more
disclosures and information sharing between regulators and the regulated
community. The current system chills this sort of communication
exchange, and therefore undermines the government's ability to use the
sanctions as a way to help track questionable money flows.
Large multinational institutions at the core of the financial
community are faced with especially complex disclosure issues.
Sanctions and enforcement policies for these companies need to be
tailored to the risks presented and the nature of their operations.
Multinational financial institutions, and separate complex large value
transfer systems such as the SWIFT network that links different banking
institutions via the U.S. Fedwire or the U.K. CHAPS systems for
example, conduct credit transfers which involve multiple transactions.
There are many steps involved in moving funds from bank to bank
before making a debit transfer to a specific customer. Thus, there may
be a series of largely automated transfers and messages related to these
inter-bank transactions that are devoid of sufficient individual
account/customer identification information to screen against the various
sanctions blacklists. It may only be at the very last stage, when a bank is
being directed to debit/pay a particular party that the transaction may be
matched to the blacklist entries. In such a complex multinational system,
under the strict liability standard, it is unclear where the institutional
involvement becomes so remote from actual improper action that
liability for non-compliance ceases. Moreover, this can be a particularly
difficult problem for a multinational commercial entity facing a need to
comply with sanctions promulgated by multiple governmental authorities
around the world.
In December, 2005, for example, without admitting any culpability,
the Dutch bank ABN AMRO N.V. entered into a consent settlement with
U.S. authorities for an $80 million civil penalty for alleged violations of
the U.S. sanctions on dealings with Iran and Libya.44 ABN's branches in
New York and Chicago cleared payments based upon instructions and
documents that originated in ABN's branches in Dubai and India. The
Indian and Dubai ABN branches had altered the documents specifically
to disguise their involvement with sanctioned parties in Iran and Libya,
and also to avoid the transactions being caught by ABN's own internal
44. ABN AMRO Bank N.V. is headquartered in Amsterdam, the Netherlands. The
bank has over $500 billion in assets, approximately 111,000 employees and roughly
3,500 offices in over 60 countries. It also maintains several branches, agencies, and
offices in the United States. See Letter from R.J. Stammer, Vice President and
Compliance Officer of ABN AMRO North America to OFAC (July 18, 2002) available
at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/interirncivpen/amro.pdf,
commenting upon proposed revisions to the publication of civil penalty information.
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compliance program. The result was that the overseas Dutch bank paid a
significant civil penalty, and incidentally agreed to outside audits and to
provide a number of special reports to the U.S. authorities over the next
three years, because some employees in its branches in Dubai and India
consciously sought to evade ABN's corporate internal compliance
program and thus made it impossible for its U.S. branches to maintain
strict compliance with the sanctions.45 Perhaps, most notably, these
penalties were all imposed as a result of ABN AMRO's own voluntary
disclosure to the U.S. authorities.46
The ABN example illustrates some of the difficulties inherent in
crafting appropriate internal compliance programs for large enterprises
with complex processes, and especially for the network of large value
transfer systems, where the full import of the transaction may only
become apparent after many innocent steps have been taken. Along with
cases such as those involving the Swedish employees of Al Barakaat, it
further highlights the need for an official mechanism at the national level
that can provide reliable information about the requirements of the
various sanctions regimes, and which will help resolve possible conflicts
among these laws. As a consequence of the absence of such a
mechanism in this case-albeit along with wrongdoing by its local
branches in India and Dubai-the Dutch banking enterprise agreed to
base the internal compliance programs it creates for its worldwide
operations on the obligations imposed by the U.S. controls, even where
those controls differ from U.N. or European requirements.
Following the ABN AMRO settlement, other banks, including the
London-based HSBC, along with Credit Suisse and UBS in Switzerland,
reportedly limited their dealings in Iran in order to avoid issues under
U.S. controls, even in the absence of U.N. or European requirements to
do SO. 4 7  Other significant fines paid by foreign banks under similar
circumstances in the past include the $100 million assessed by U.S.
authorities against UBS in 2004 for currency transfers to Cuba, Iran,
Libya and the former Yugoslavia, after various employees doctored
45. See U.S. Treasury Dept., Order of Assessment of a Civil Monetary Penalty and
Monetary Payment and Order to File Reports Issued Upon Consent involving ABN
AMRO Bank N. V, (Dec. 19, 2005) available at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/
enforcement/ofac/civpen/penalties/amrocmp.pdf.
46. See id. ABN AMRO did have a pre-existing agreement, dated July 23, 2004,
with the Federal Reserve Bank and state authorities in New York and Illinois designed to
correct deficiencies at the New York Branch relating to other anti-money laundering
policies, procedures, and practices and had taken substantial steps to rectify the
deficiencies addressed in that agreement, when it discovered and disclosed the facts
relating to the additional transactions that were the subject of this settlement agreement.
47. See Steven R. Weisman and Nazila Fathi, Pressed By U.S., European Banks
Limit Iran Deals, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2006, at Al.
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records to hide the transactions; and the $200 million fine imposed on the
Bank of Credit and Commerce International in 1991 for violating
American banking laws on fraud and money laundering.48
III. Conclusion
Targeted economic sanctions are powerful tools to augment
governmental efforts to address global terrorism and similar intractable
international problems. Whether sanctions are regarded as foreign policy
measures or as tools addressing international criminality, a number of
steps can be taken to enhance their credibility and commercial
practicability, and thereby promote more effective and widespread
compliance in support of governmental objectives.
These steps include:
1. Formulating sanctions controls on a risk-based model that:
* distinguishes among the obligations imposed on
the various types of businesses or industries
comprising the regulated community;
* distinguishes between the primary targets of the
sanctions (e.g. Tier I designees), and secondary or
tertiary targets (e.g. Tier II designees); and
* provides an official mechanism to resolve
questionable blacklist matches (on national,
international, or foreign blacklists) whose advice
may be relied upon by the regulated community.
2. Aligning enforcement practices and resources with those
risk-based controls by:
* establishing governmental standards for liability
for non-compliance, or alternatively recognizing
industry developed "best practices" for
compliance;
* providing a "safe-harbor" where internal
compliance programs are in place which meet
such standards or practices; and
* establishing de minimis exemptions for trivial
violations, and an intentional or "knowing"
standard for liability, that seek to achieve realistic
levels of compliance.
48. See Timothy L. O'Brien, Lockboxes, Iraqi Loot And a Trail To the Fed, N.Y.
TIMES, June 6, 2004, at § 3.
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3. Creating an official mechanism that:
" corrects blacklisting mistakes, permits challenges
to blacklisting decisions based upon changed
circumstances, or that mediates or resolves
conflicts among national, international, or foreign
sanctions regimes; and
" encourages more communication and cooperation
between the government and the regulated
community as partners in addressing these new
global threats.
Global terrorism will not be stopped solely by military action or the
use of force. Targeted economic sanctions specifically aimed at those
who conduct or enable terrorist acts are an integral part of the effort.
These sanctions, however, must be designed to have a practical and
substantial impact in the marketplace. They cannot simply be broad
policy statements focused more on domestic politics than on achieving
their stated aims. Doing so means that government regulators and the
regulated community must become partners in the effort to a much
greater degree than has been the case in the past.
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